Abstract Urban planning has the potential to be a powerful tool for facilitating efficient and equitable adaptation to climate change-related coastal hazards ('coastal climate hazards'). However, if urban planning measures are poorly designed or implemented, it can increase costs and vulnerability, and unfairly affect the interests of particular groups. Through a case study on the coastal climate hazard planning framework in Victoria, Australia, this paper aims to illustrate how urban planning measures can lead to maladaptation and draw lessons for the future design and implementation of planning responses. Five main policy lessons are drawn from the case study. First, planning frameworks should encourage the adoption of robust approaches that are as insensitive to the uncertainties associated with coastal climate hazards as possible. Secondly, policy makers need to be mindful of the opportunity costs and equity implications of planning responses. Thirdly, to be sustainable, planning responses must be robust to social and political factors, something that can be achieved through the use of flexible approaches that allow continued use and development of land but on conditions that protect the interests of governments and communities. Fourthly, policy makers need to be mindful of transaction costs. Finally, when devolving planning responsibilities to lower levels of government, policy makers need to ensure that the objectives of planning frameworks are clear, there is minimal ambiguity in decision guidelines, and that the resourcing and capacity constraints of planning bodies are appropriately considered.
storms, pose a significant challenge for coastal communities. These hazards could potentially threaten existing and proposed settlements and infrastructure, and give rise to the pressing policy question of how urban planning systems should respond. Typically, the options are categorised as protect (e.g. build defensive structures), accommodate (e.g. raise floor levels in buildings, beach renourishment) or retreat (e.g. relocate settlements) (IPCC CZMS 1990; McLean et al. 2001; Klein et al. 2001; Nicholls et al. 2007 ). This simple typology hides the complexities surrounding the implementation of these options. The scale, distribution and timing of future coastal climate hazards are unknown, and there is no objective way of assigning probabilities to potential outcomes (Yohe and Neumann 1997; Nicholls and Cazenave 2010; Mastrandrea and Luers 2012) . This creates difficulties when judging the optimal timing and nature of responses. Any fixed response runs the risk of being judged, with hindsight, to be an under-or over-reaction (Titus 1990 (Titus , 1998 Mendelsohn 2000; Dobes 2008; Mastrandrea and Luers 2012) .
To complicate matters further, responses to coastal climate hazards can involve externalities (Titus 1998; IPCC CZMS 1990; Bray et al. 1997; Mendelsohn 2000; Benoit et al. 2007; Nicholls et al. 2007; Tol et al. 2008) . The construction of seawalls to protect private property, for example, will deflect wave energy and disrupt sand movement, resulting in harm to neighbouring properties and public areas, including beaches (IPCC CZMS 1990; Bray et al. 1997; Benoit et al. 2007; Pace 2011; Hanek and Moreno 2012) . Preventing landholders from constructing defensive structures will eliminate the externality but not all of the losses; some of the costs will be redistributed. Rather than neighbouring property owners and the broader society incurring losses, private landholders will suffer as their property is adversely affected by erosion and inundation (Bray et al. 1997; Titus 1998; Nicholls et al. 2007 ; de la VegaLeinert and Nicholls 2008; Cooper and McKenna 2008; Coleman 2010) . Other urban planning responses can give rise to similar welfare and distributional implications. Preventing development in areas susceptible to future hazards can reduce losses to landholders, insurers and governments. However, there is an associated opportunity cost-the capacity to use and develop the land-that falls on the current property owner (Bray et al. 1997; Titus 1998) . Likewise, mandatory hazard warnings can enable property owners and potential purchasers to make more informed choices (Ruppert 2011 ). Yet, in doing so, they can adversely affect property prices, exposing governments to a political backlash from landholders; something that has already been witnessed in Australian coastal communities (Cronshaw 2012) .
The potential for planning responses to negatively affect interests in land provides a barrier to anticipatory public adaptation. Weighing in the other direction is the future financial exposure of governments. While improved information and price signals (land prices, insurance premiums, insurance coverage etc.) will prompt private adaptive behaviour (Yohe et al. 1996) , it is inevitable that some uninsured assets will be affected by coastal climate hazard events prior to the end of their useful life. In liberal democracies, it is equally unavoidable that some property owners will seek assistance from governments in these circumstances, potentially through litigation, and that governments will offer assistance, often to advance their political interests (Yohe and Neumann 1997; Sobel and Leeson 2006; McDonald 2011; Christie 2011) . Governments also have their own assets that could be threatened by future hazards. The blessing for current governments is the time lag before the threats materialise, creating a temptation to unnecessarily defer responses.
A number of studies have highlighted that urban planning can be used as a way of facilitating efficient and equitable adaptation, and stressed the need for measures to address coastal climate hazards to be integrated into planning processes as soon as possible (Burby and Nelson 1991; Bray et al. 1997; Wilson 2006; de Vries 2006; NVROM et al. 2007; Tol et al. 2008; Wilson and Piper 2010; Hansen 2010; McDonald 2011; Measham et al. 2011; Abel et al. 2011; Alexander et al. 2012) . For example, Tol et al. (2008, p. 436) argue that, because of the unresponsive nature of urban planning processes, 'it is important that the implications of climate change and [sea level rise] are integrated into regulations now'. While these general propositions are not in dispute, if planning responses are not appropriately designed and implemented, they can easily produce inequitable outcomes and maladaptations, where actions taken to prepare for or respond to global warming increase the social costs of climate change (Moser et al. 1990; Titus 1998; Mendelsohn 2000; Barnett and O'Neill 2010; McDonald 2011; Alexander et al. 2012) . To some extent, the adoption of suboptimal planning responses is inevitable. Decision makers do not have perfect foresight and errors will be made (Easterling et al. 2004 ). Further, as Klein et al. (2001) , Easterling et al. (2004) and Tol et al. (2008) have emphasised, adaptation to coastal climate hazards will usually be an iterative process, with measures being refined over time in response to new information on threats, changing preferences, and feedback on the successes and failures of previous approaches. Ideally, this iterative process will occur within an adaptive management framework, where learning from experience is an integral part of the policy cycle (Holling 1978; Walters 1986; McLain and Lee 1996; Tol et al. 2008) .
While there is a significant body of research on the role of urban planning in addressing coastal climate hazards, and recognition of the potential for maladaptation and the need to learn from past mistakes, there is a dearth of literature detailing how, in practice, urban planning can lead to inefficient and inequitable outcomes. This paper is intended to help fill this void. It presents a case study on the coastal climate hazard planning framework that was introduced in Victoria, Australia, in 2008. The framework and the way it has been implemented have been controversial, attracting widespread public interest and triggering numerous disputes. Most of the concerns have centred on whether it embodies an excessive aversion to uncertainty and imposes unreasonable costs on landholders (Wimbush et al. 2010a, b; Morton and Arup 2012) . Through this case study, the paper aims to illustrate how urban planning measures can lead to maladaptation and draw lessons for the future design and implementation of planning responses.
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 provides background on Victoria and its planning system. Section 3 describes the coastal climate hazard planning framework. Section 4 analyses the framework and identifies the major issues associated with its design and implementation. Section 5 discusses the lessons for policy makers and concludes.
Urban planning in Victoria

The state of Victoria
Australia is a federation consisting of six states, two self-governing mainland territories, and a collection of external territories. Victoria is a state located in the south-eastern corner of the mainland. Territorially, it is mainland Australia's smallest state, with a land area of 227 416 km 2 and a maritime jurisdiction of 10,213 km 2 , but it has the second largest population (5.54 million), second highest population density (24 people per km 2 ) and second largest economy (Geoscience Australia 2010; ABS 2011 ABS , 2012 . Its mainland coastline stretches for 1,868 km and it has a further 644 km of island coastline (Geoscience Australia 2010). Some 20 % of Victoria's population lives in coastal areas and over 80 % live within 50 km of the coast (ABS 2004; VCC 2008) . The coastal profile of the population is mainly attributable to the fact that over 4 million people live in Melbourne, Victoria's capital city, which is located on Port Phillip Bay.
Australia has three levels of government: Commonwealth, state and self-governing territory, and local councils. Within this hierarchy, urban planning issues have traditionally been the domain of the states and territories, and local councils (Kay et al. 1996) . The Australian Government's involvement in land use planning and regulation is limited. Due to this, the Victorian Government and Victoria's 21 coastal councils have primary responsibility for addressing the urban planning issues associated with coastal climate hazards (there is one other coastal municipality, French Island, Sandstone Island and Elizabeth Island, for which the Victorian Minister for Planning is the planning authority and responsible authority).
Overview of Victoria's planning system
Victoria's urban planning system was derived from the British system and has many of the standard features seen in western land use and development processes (Eccles and Bryant 2011). Planning policies and controls are contained in municipal planning schemes, which are operationalized through spatial zoning maps. People wanting to use and develop land are required to comply with the requirements of the planning scheme. This can involve the need to obtain a planning permit and adhere to conditions attached to it. The bulk of the functions associated with the planning system are performed by local councils. They are usually the responsible authorities that administer the planning schemes and decide planning permit applications. They are also planning authorities and can prepare amendments to planning schemes.
Two characteristics of the Victorian planning system set it apart from many others (Eccles and Bryant 2011). First, it is standardised. All municipal planning schemes accord to a prescribed format and contain 'state standard provisions' and 'local provisions'. The state standard provisions consist of stock standard provisions taken from the Victoria Planning Provisions (VPPs), which, amongst other things, cover the State Planning Policy Framework (SPPF), state standard zones and overlay controls. The local provisions, the Local Planning Policy Framework, consist of a Municipal Strategic Statement (MSS) (land use and develop objectives and policies and strategies for achieving them) and specific provisions governing use and development within the municipality.
Secondly, the autonomy of local councils in the planning system is tightly constrained. This is a product of the powers of other governmental bodies. Details of the most relevant of these bodies are set out below. The powers of these bodies mean that a local council is unable to unilaterally adopt a policy position to deal with coastal climate hazards. The success of any council policy hinges on the extent to which it is supported by the other institutions in the planning system. & State planning minister. Much of the power in the planning system is centralised in the hands of the planning minister. The minister is the only person that can make and amend planning schemes. The minister also sets the VPPs that must be included in all schemes, can amend any planning scheme at will and can take the power to decide particular permit applications from councils. & Referral authorities. Where provided for in the planning scheme, councils are required to refer permit applications to referral authorities and comply with their recommendations regarding their treatment. For coastal climate hazards, the most relevant referral authorities are Victoria's ten floodplain authorities (nine Catchment Management Authorities (CMAs) that cover the rural areas and Melbourne Water within the Port Phillip and Western Port Catchment Management Region). & Victorian Coastal Council and regional coastal boards. The Victorian Coastal Council is responsible for preparing the Victorian Coastal Strategy and the state's three regional coastal boards can prepare coastal action plans. Local councils are required to take the strategy and any applicable action plan into account when determining permit applications and performing other relevant functions, including preparing planning scheme amendments. & Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) . Under the planning system, permit applicants, objectors and other third parties are entitled to seek merits review of planning permit decisions before VCAT. In deciding appeals, VCAT effectively 'sits in the shoes' of the original decision maker and is required to have regard to all matters considered by the responsible authority. & Planning panels and advisory committees. Planning panels are appointed by the state planning minister to consider and report on proposed amendments to planning schemes. Planning authorities are not required to adhere to the recommendations of a panel but they must consider them prior to making a final decision on whether to proceed with a proposed amendment. Advisory committees are similar to the planning panels; they are statutory bodies established by the state planning minister to provide advice on particular planning issues. While both planning panels and committees only have advisory functions, they play an important role in the Victorian planning system and can have considerable influence on its design and implementation.
3 Victorian coastal climate hazards framework
Case study method
In preparing the case study and analysis on Victoria's coastal climate hazard planning framework, a review was undertaken of the following. Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with strategic planners in 14 coastal councils, and the minutes from the meetings of nine coastal councils over the period January 2009 to May 2012 were inspected. A list of the main planning materials and reports that were reviewed, and the councils that were interviewed, is provided in the Electronic Supplementary Material, Section A.
Consistent with the objectives of the article, the emphasis of the case study is on identifying aspects of the framework that provide insights into how to design and implement urban planning responses to coastal climate hazards. The case study is deliberately limited in its scope and does not seek to exhaustively review all aspects of the framework and its implementation. 
Victorian coastal strategy 2008
The centrepiece of the strategy is the policy that decision makers should "apply the precautionary principle to planning and management decision-making when considering the risks associated with climate change" (VCC 2008, p. 38) . The strategy formally uses the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development's (1992, Principle 15) definition of the precautionary principle. However, in the body of the strategy, the principle is described as:
… a 'commonsense' notion that requires decision-makers to be cautious when assessing potential health or environmental harms in the absence of the full scientific facts (VCC 2008, p. 37) .
To put the principle into practice, the strategy requires decision makers to:
& plan for sea level rise of not less than 0.8 m by 2100 and allow for the combined effects of tides, storm surges, coastal processes and local conditions; & avoid development in low-lying coastal areas; and & ensure that new development is located and designed so that it can be appropriately protected from climate change's risks and impacts and coastal hazards (VCC 2008, p. 38) .
In essence, the strategy embodies an approach that is averse to uncertainty, where the objective is to minimise future threats and avoid putting developments in locations that could be affected by future inundation, coastal flooding and coastal erosion. Under the terms of clause 13, planning bodies are also required to have regard to the Victorian Coastal Strategy 2008 and the Future Coasts Program vulnerability mapping in performing coastal planning functions. The Future Coasts Program was established by the Victorian Government in 2008 to assessing the risks and impacts of sea-level rise and storm surges on Victoria's coast. The assessment has three elements: digital elevation modelling to provide a representation of the elevation of coastal areas to 10 m AHD (Australian Height Datum); coastal landform and geomorphology classification in order to identify areas susceptible to erosion and accretion; and sea level rise and extreme sea level modelling. The plan under the program is that after the completion of the Victorian state-wide assessment, additional local assessments will be undertaken in high risk areas. Originally, the statewide assessment was scheduled to be completed by late 2010. At the time of writing in June 2012, it had not been released.
Ministerial Direction No. 13
The Ministerial Direction applies to planning scheme amendments involving the rezoning of non-urban land for urban use and development where the land abuts the coastline or a coastal reserve, or is less than 5 m AHD and 1 km from the coastline. In these circumstances, planning authorities are required to include, in the materials sent to the planning minister, an explanation of how the amendment is consistent with the SPPF framework, addresses the current and future risks associated with coastal climate hazards, presents an outcome that seeks to avoid or minimise exposing future development to projected coastal climate hazards, and ensures new development will be located, designed and protected from potential coastal hazards to the extent practicable (Madden 2008).
Managing coastal hazards and the coastal impacts of climate change
The General Practice Note, which was published in late 2008, requires local councils, when faced with proposals in coastal areas, to use site-specific 'coastal hazard vulnerability assessments' (CHVAs) to help identify and evaluate risks, and to make final decisions on the basis of three general principles: risk avoidance, integrated coastal planning and the precautionary approach (VDPCD 2008) . The risk avoidance principle in the practice note requires new uses and development to be sited and designed "in a way that does not unnecessarily expose future communities and assets to coastal hazard risks over its intended lifespan" (VDPCD 2008, p. 3) . This is then subdivided into two hazard types: coastal erosion and inundation. For coastal erosion, avoidance is defined as ensuring that new uses and development "is not affected by the retreat of a coastline over the intended design lifespan" (VDPCD 2008, p. 3) . Avoidance for inundation means "ensuring that new use and development is not placed in harm's way and is located beyond, or above an area prone to temporary inundation" (VDPCD 2008, p. 3) .
The integrated coastal planning principle requires triple-bottom line or sustainability assessments (economic, environmental and social) of the future impacts of coastal hazard risk exposure. The precautionary approach is defined in the practice note in terms similar to the description of the precautionary principle in the Victorian Coastal Strategy 2008. The practice note states that it:
[r]equires decision makers to act having regard to the best available science, knowledge and understanding of the consequences of decisions and in the context of increasing uncertainty, to make decisions that minimise adverse impacts on current and future generations and the environment (VDPCD 2008, p. 3).
All four of the planning instruments that contain the state framework are based on the same premise: that planning bodies should assume 0.8 m sea level rise by 2100 is a reality and avoid developments that could be at risk from coastal climate hazards under this scenario. The priority is to ensure that people and property are not placed in harm's way.
The state framework and maladaptation
Deterministic decision making
Mandatory sea level rise planning benchmarks are a commonly used policy instrument and, at the time of writing, had been adopted in five Australian states (Kay et al. 1996; McLean et al. 2001; Walsh et al. 2004; Gibbs and Hill 2011) . Their primary attributes are simplicity and that they can provide a degree of regulatory certainty for developers, communities and local governments. The downside of fixed sea level rise benchmarks is that they can induce deterministic decision making, where the prescribed level of sea level rise is treated as a certainty and responses are designed to avoid the associated impacts.
Deterministic responses are problematic because of the degree of uncertainty surrounding coastal climate hazards (Titus 1990 (Titus , 1998 Moser et al. 1990; Kay et al. 1996; Yohe and Neumann 1997; Mendelsohn 2000; Walsh et al. 2004; Dobes 2008; Nicholls and Cazenave 2010; Mastrandrea and Luers 2012) . The scale, distribution and timing of these hazards are a product of multiple natural and social factors-including greenhouse gas emissions, nongreenhouse gas anthropogenic forcings, the airborne fraction of carbon dioxide, climate sensitivity, thermal expansion of the oceans, ice-sheet melt, regional temperature changes, localised changes in wave activity and sand movement, local geomorphology etc.-most of which are subject to considerable uncertainty. The nature of the relevant uncertainties covers the spectrum, from standard risk (know odds) and uncertainty (known parameters, unknown odds) to ignorance (unknown unknowns) and indeterminacy (where the causal chains of elements subject to risk and uncertainty are open) (Wynne 1992; Walsh et al. 2004; Swart et al. 2009 ). In addition, there is a lack of consensus on how to assign probabilities within known parameters and how to rank alternative options (Bray et al. 1997; Titus 1998; Lembert et al. 2004 ). Due to the deep nature of the uncertainties, deterministic responses framed around avoiding the impacts associated with a prescribed planning benchmark may not be robust, in the sense of being able to perform satisfactorily across the range of possible outcomes (Titus 1990 (Titus , 1998 Moser et al. 1990; Ben-Haim 2001; Lembert et al. 2004; Regan et al. 2005; Swart et al. 2009 ). Victoria's sea-level rise benchmark was derived from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report (4AR), which projected sea level rise under the scenarios from the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) between 1980 -1999 and 2090 -2099 (Nakicenovic and Swart 2000 Meehl et al. 2007 ). The benchmark of 0.8 m by 2100 was taken from the high range (95 % maxima) A1FI scenario; a 'worst case' scenario that assumes the international community follows a fossil fuel-intensive development path and that no direct policies are introduced to mitigate emissions. The climate outcomes under this scenario are vastly different from those envisaged under the Cancun Agreements, which set an aspirational target of limiting warming to 2°C above preindustrial levels (UNFCCC Secretariat 2011). To achieve this target, anthropogenic radiative forcing in the late 21st century would have to be~2.5 watts per square metre (Wm −2 ), well below the 9.14 Wm −2 reached in 2100 under the A1FI scenario Meinshausen et al. 2011) (Table 1) .
While setting planning benchmarks on the basis of a worst case scenario that is inconsistent with mitigation policy is problematic (Macintosh 2010) , the decision framing around the benchmark is of greater importance. Any potential problems associated with what may be subjectively judged to be an overly pessimistic or optimistic benchmark can be overcome if decision makers are encouraged to adopt robust approaches that are as insensitive to the uncertainties associated with coastal climate hazards as possible (Titus 1990 (Titus , 1998 Moser et al. 1990; Bray et al. 1997; Lembert et al. 2004) .
Although the Victorian Coastal Strategy 2008 discusses the uncertainties associated with sea level rise, and notes that the policy will be "reviewed as scientific data becomes available" (VCC 2008, p. 36) , the primary objective of the framework is to avoid the impacts associated with the benchmark. By placing the emphasis on the benchmark, and failing to promote robust responses, the framework encourages deterministic decision making. In the analysis conducted for this study, two approaches were found to be common amongst planning bodies. Either they assessed the threats to proposed developments against the 0.8 m benchmark (regardless of the expected life of the development), or against a lower benchmark derived from the high range A1FI scenario on the basis of the economic life of the development (VCAT 2009a (VCAT , b, 2010a (VCAT , b, c, d, e, f, g, 2011 Clarke 2009; Marsden et al. 2009; Kirsch and Gibson 2010; Moles et al. 2010; Melbourne Water 2011) . Fixed responses were then crafted with the intent of ensuring the development was not impacted by the associated hazards, including storm surge, flooding and tidal effects. In some instances, this led to highly precautionary decision making, where developments were stopped on the basis of distant threats, or subject to conditions requiring the immediate construction of protective measures design to shield against distant impacts (Electronic Supplementary Material, Section B). Where decision makers shaped responses around the economic life of the development, less precautionary outcomes were found. However, the outcomes were often still based on the premise that sea level rise will be no more or less than the specified benchmark (VCAT 2010h, i; Atkins Maritime Engineering 2010; Victorian Government 2010a; Melbourne Water 2011; Borough of Queenscliffe 2011a, b). In either case, there is the prospect that the responses will later be judged an under-or over-reaction.
As a number of studies have found (Titus 1990 (Titus , 1998 Moser et al. 1990; Bray et al. 1997; Mendelsohn 2000; McLean et al. 2001; Dobes 2008; World Bank 2010; APC 2012) , improved efficiency and equity outcomes can be achieved through the use of flexible or dynamic approaches that allow for adjustments to be made in response to events. This is a product of the fact that, by facilitating step-wise (or iterative) decision making, flexible approaches can lower anticipatory adaptation costs and lead to improved impact minimisation outcomes compared to more deterministic approaches. For urban planning, flexibility can be promoted by embedding alternative use and development options in planning instruments and responses. To accomplish this, planning agencies can use real options, financial (2010) options, futures contracts, mandatory but conditional regulatory instruments, time limited approvals, and other similar mechanisms that promote, facilitate or mandate changes to land uses and developments when coastal hazards materialise or are imminent. The precise nature of the flexibility instruments will depend on the desired outcomes and response strategy that is employed (protect, accommodate, retreat), both of which ideally should reflect community preferences (Moser et al. 1990 ). Examples of the types of flexibility instruments that could be used are provided in Table 2 . Already in Victoria, flexible planning instruments have been employed in a limited number of cases to deal with coastal climate hazards (VCAT 2009c). The most high profile example concerns the stretch of coast between Portland and Narrawong, in the state's west. Interim restrictions were imposed on development in this area in 2007 because of concerns about existing coastal hazards and their intensification with climate change (the area has been subject to extensive coastal erosion since the construction of a breakwater at the Port of Portland in the mid-1950s) (Collins and Winkler 1994; Reidel 2002; AECOM Australia 2010) . Despite the threat from coastal hazards, the interim restrictions caused consternation amongst landholders as they effectively prevented any new residential development. Mindful of the contentious nature of the issues, the local council (Glenelg Shire Council) commissioned the preparation of a detailed coastal engineering study to inform its long-term policy response (AECOM Australia 2010). After the completion of the study but before the finalisation of the council's policy, a state election was called and, during the election campaign, the opposition promising to ensure that residential development in the area could proceed, provided it was "at private risk" (Guy 2010, p. 1; Guy 2011) . The opposition went on to win the election and, after taking office, the new state planning minister amended the local planning scheme to make himself the responsible authority and allow residential development on the condition that the "dwelling is designed to enable relocation in the event future coastal processes threaten the safety of the land and appurtenant dwelling" (Victorian Government 2011, p. 2). While the process was less than ideal, the outcome reflects an innovative use of a flexible planning response.
The precautionary approach and proportionality
The precautionary approach embodied in the state framework is at odds with the traditional interpretation of the precautionary principle. As formally defined, the principle states that "where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation" (Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992, Principle 15)). The leading Australian legal case on the issue is Telstra Corporation Ltd v Hornsby Shire Council (NSWLEC 2006) , where Chief Justice Brian Preston held that, for the principle to apply, two conditions precedent must be present: a threat of serious or irreversible environmental damage and scientific uncertainty as to the nature and scope of the threat. If these conditions are satisfied, there is a shift in the burden of proof-the decision maker must assume the threat is a reality-and proportionate measures may be taken to avoid or mitigate the potential harm. Chief Justice Preston's judgment stresses that the precautionary principle does not require the elimination of risks and that decision-makers must be mindful of the need for proportionality in the response.
In applying the precautionary principle, measures should be adopted that are proportionate to the potential threats. A reasonable balance must be struck between the stringency of the precautionary measures, which may have associated costs, such as Bray et al. (1997) ; Titus (1998) ; Turbott and Stewart (2006) financial, livelihood and opportunity costs, and the seriousness and irreversibility of the potential threat (NSWLEC 2006, para. 167 ).
The approach adopted by Chief Justice Preston was drawn from, and is consistent with, the extensive literature on the precautionary principle and associated literature on the management of uncertainty, threshold effects, irreversibility, and the safe minimum standards approach (Ciriacy-Wantrup 1952; Batie 1988; Tisdell 1990; Perrings and Pearce 1994; Deville and Harding 1997; Palmini 1999; Berrens 2001; Cooney and Dickson 2005; de Sadeleer 2005) .
The Victorian framework's precautionary approach bears little resemblance to the dominant interpretation of the precautionary principle described by Chief Justice Preston. The focus is on risk avoidance; ensuring that people and property are not affected by the coastal climate hazards that could arise under the high range SRES A1FI sea level rise projections. Very little consideration is given to the opportunity costs associated with avoiding the uncertain future impacts. The only material reference to the need to consider the opportunity cost of precautionary responses in the main framework documents is found in the General Practice Note, where one of 11 matters identified as possible considerations in urban rezonings is the "intended use and design lifespan and value of a proposal assessed against the relative risk exposure during that time" (VDPCD 2008, p. 4) . This relatively vague requirement is overwhelmed by the repeated emphasis on precaution and desire to avoid adverse impacts. For example, the opening paragraph of the section on rezonings in the General Practice Note states:
Given the current body of knowledge and information an important principle is the need to avoid the further intensification of development in areas that are likely to be impacted by projected coastal hazards under climate change (VDPCD 2008, p. 4) .
The failure to stress the need to consider opportunity costs, combined with the prominence given to deterministic responses and precaution, has led some planning bodies to treat potential future losses as the equivalent of certain present costs (Electronic Supplementary Material, Section B). In economic language, the threats have not been weighted and a near zero social time preference rate has been used (if only implicitly) to discount future losses; something that is difficult to justify on either empirical or normative grounds (Weitzman 2007) . Due to this, one of the main downsides of the state framework is that, at times, it has generated outcomes where the opportunity costs have been disproportionate to the nature of the threats. This has wasted resources and generated inequitable outcomes.
Ambiguity and inconsistency
The Victorian framework is based on an awkward distribution of powers and responsibilities. It provides broad principles that are intended to guide decision-making by planning and responsible authorities. However, it does not dictate outcomes and is vague about what is expected in the treatment of coastal climate hazard issues. This has enabled councils to devise different approaches but the scope of their discretion is subject to the Minister's and VCAT's powers to review and reverse their decisions. As a consequence of the jumbled governance structure and vague procedural and substantive requirements, the implementation of the framework has been characterised by inconsistency.
The extent and nature of the inconsistencies are best illustrated by VCAT, a body that has played a central role in the framework's development and implementation. Lacking capacity and faced with ambiguous principles, many councils have looked to VCAT for guidance and direction. VCAT though, has been unable to adopt a consistent approach to the framework's principles. This is shown in Table 3 , which provides examples of how different VCAT cases have treated substantive issues raised by applicants and respondents in relation to coastal climate hazards. VCAT decisions concerning when CHVAs are required have displayed similar inconsistencies (Electronic Supplementary Material, Section C, Tables C1 and C2) .
Part of the explanation for the observed variability in VCAT decisions is the nature of the Tribunal. It is a merits-review body and its decisions do not set binding precedents; they are only binding on the parties to the proceedings (Eccles and Bryant 2011). Due to this, inconsistencies in approach are not uncommon and can simply be a product of the different values and preferences of VCAT members. VCAT also suffers from the same, if not worse, capacity constraints concerning the evaluation of coastal climate hazards as councils (Few et al. 2007; Hanek and Moreno 2012) . While VCAT members all have skills and expertise in particular areas, few have a detailed knowledge of climate change and, in hearing cases, have limited capacity to investigate relevant issues (Eccles and Bryant 2011) . Against this background, it was foreseeable that the ambiguities in the state framework would lead to inconsistencies in VCAT decisions.
The inconsistencies in approach have not been confined to VCAT; there have been significant differences in the approaches adopted by councils and floodplain authorities (Clarke 2009; Marsden et al. 2009; McRobert 2009; Wimbush et al. 2009; Moles et al. 2010; Kirsch and Gibson 2010; Guy 2010 Guy , 2011 Victorian Government 2010 Melbourne Water 2011; Borough of Queenscliffe 2011a, b; Electronic Supplementary Material, Sections B and C) . In many instances, diversity in regulation and the provision of public goods and services can be positive, allowing policy packages to be aligned with community preferences and facilitating experimentation (Mill 1848; Bryce 1888; Oates 1972 Oates , 1999 Tiebout 1956; Ostrom et al. 1961) . Here, there has been a more chaotic decision making process triggered by ambiguity in the state framework and a lack of capacity in relevant planning bodies. This has led to inequitable outcomes and created regulatory uncertainty.
Transaction costs
Both strategic and statutory planning processes can involve significant transaction costs, including those associated with stakeholder consultations, assessments, spatial mapping, enforcement, compliance, litigation and appeals (transaction costs are defined here as the costs of establishing and maintaining freedoms and liberties concerning the use and enjoyment of a good or service, consistent with the property rights literature (Allen 1991 (Allen , 2000 ). In seeking to maximise the welfare benefits generated by planning processes, governments should be mindful of the magnitude and distribution of these costs. Arguably, in designing the Victorian framework, insufficient attention was given to these issues. Three transaction cost-related issues stand out.
The first stems from the reliance on CHVAs as a means of improving planning decisions. This approach is based on the simple (arguably naïve) premise that more information necessarily leads to better outcomes; a notion for which there is a lack of persuasive evidence in the social sciences and that is challenged by the deep uncertainties associated with coastal climate hazards (Bartlett and Kurian 1999; Lembert et al. 2004 ). Whether or not additional information can improve decision making, site-specific CHVAs are not a costeffective way of conducting coastal assessments, a point made by VCAT and other planning bodies on multiple occasions (VCAT 2009a (VCAT , 2010b Wimbush et al. 2009 Wimbush et al. , 2010a . In addition, due to the limited resources available for their preparation (CHVAs have generally cost between AU$3,000 and AU$5,000 per report) and confined scope, the site-specific CHVAs that have been published have varied in quality and utility (VCAT 2009d, j) . A broader concern associated with all coastal assessments is that their capacity to improve decision making is largely dependent on the treatment of uncertainty. By using a single sea level rise benchmark, the state framework has encouraged the generation of assessments based solely on the high-range SRES A1FI projection. This can leave decision makers without sufficient information on the potential range of threats and, in the worst case, create a false sense of certainty and promote deterministic decision making. This is a risk with the site-specific CHVAs that have been undertaken and the state-wide assessment being conducted as part of the Future Coasts Program, which is basing its modelling on the highrange SRES A1FI projection. The second transaction cost-related issue is that the framework has generated a significant number of disputes and appeals and increased legal costs. From late 2008 when the state framework was first introduced to 30 May 2012, there were at least 46 VCAT planning permit appeals where coastal climate hazards were a material issue the proceedings (Electronic Supplementary Material, Section A). There is also evidence of disputes concerning the framework in several other planning processes (Moles et al. 2009 (Moles et al. , 2010 King 2011; Wimbush et al. 2009 Wimbush et al. , 2010a SGSC 2010; HIA 2011) . While conflict over the distributional implications of adaptation responses is, to some extent, unavoidable, the structure of the framework, particularly its ambiguity and the failure of the state government to provide guidance, has exacerbated these risks.
The third transaction cost issue involves the use of site-specific climate change response plans and agreements (known as section 173 agreements) as a way of shielding councils against future liability for planning decisions. This approach has been adopted by several councils, including the Moyne, Wellington, South Gippsland and Bass Coast Shire Councils, and Casey City Council (VCAT 2009e; Moles et al. 2009; Wimbush et al. 2009 ). While the desire of councils to minimise their legal exposure is understandable, this site-specific approach involves unnecessary costs. In New South Wales (another Australian state), a more cost-effective solution has been instituted through a jurisdiction-wide liability exemption for good faith actions taken (or not taken) by councils in relation to coastal climate hazards (section 733 of the Local Government Act 1993).
Conclusions
Urban planning is an indispensable part of the public response to coastal climate hazards. Its role in regulating land use and development means that, like it or not, it will inevitably shape how communities respond to coastal threats. Moreover, when well design and implemented, it can help overcome barriers to adaptation and facilitate efficient and equitable outcomes. However, like all policy instruments, its cost-effectiveness depends on the user. In certain circumstances, urban planning responses can trigger inequity and maladaptation. The Victorian coastal climate hazards framework illustrates the types of issues that can lead to suboptimal planning outcomes. Five main policy lessons can be drawn from Victoria's experiences.
First, planning frameworks should encourage the adoption of robust approaches that are as insensitive to the uncertainties associated with coastal climate hazards as possible. Decision makers need to be aware of the deep uncertainties associated with coastal climate hazards and the benefits of flexible planning instruments. Particular care should be taken with the policy framing around sea level rise planning benchmarks; an over-emphasis on avoiding the impacts associated with a single projection of sea level rise can lead to deterministic and costly responses.
Secondly, much of the literature on urban planning responses focuses on the costs of inaction, maintaining the status quo and trying to defend existing settlements and coastlines (Smith 1997; Pethick 2002; Abel et al. 2011; Alexander et al. 2012) . When designing planning frameworks, policy makers also need to be mindful of the opportunity costs and equity implications of proposed responses. Due to the timeframes involved and discounting, the costs associated with highly precautionary responses can be substantial (Moser et al. 1990) .
Thirdly, planning responses to coastal climate hazards will evolve iteratively, with lessons from the past being used to improve systems and practices (Klein et al. 2001; Easterling et al. 2004; Tol et al. 2008 ). This iterative policy cycle has been observed in Victoria, where the coastal climate hazard planning framework is currently under review and changes are anticipated to address some of the concerns associated with its design and implementation (Wimbush et al. 2010a, b; Victorian Government 2012) . The pressure for change demonstrates the need for planning responses to be robust to social and political factors. In particular, responses that impose high costs on landholders are unlikely to be sustainable. This again highlights the benefits of flexible responses that allow continued use and development of land that could be threatened by coastal hazards in the future but on conditions that protect the interests of governments and communities.
Fourthly, transaction costs can affect the efficiency and equity of coastal climate hazard planning frameworks. In Victoria, transaction cost issues have arisen in relation to information gathering (over-reliance on site-specific CHVAs), planning disputes (appeals and conflict triggered by ambiguity and highly precautionary and deterministic decision making), and risk allocation (over-reliance on site-specific agreements as a way of shielding local councils from future liability). The case study demonstrates the need for policy makers to be mindful of transaction costs when designing planning responses, especially the potential for ambiguities in planning frameworks to increase legal costs and the opportunities for cost-savings through the centralised provision of information and risk allocation measures.
Finally, a number of studies have asserted that planning decisions for coastal climate hazards should be devolved to lower levels of government because local decision-makers are better placed to devise responses that match the preferences and needs of the community (Garnaut 2008) . This proposition, which has its origins in Oates' decentralisation theorem (Oates 1972), needs to be qualified as there are often cost-savings from centralisation and inter-jurisdictional externalities that can lead to inefficiencies if responsibility for coastal climate hazards is wholly devolved to lower levels of government (APC 2012). For example, it will often be more cost-effective for centralised approaches to be adopted in relation to the provision of information, as demonstrated by the Future Coasts Program. Similarly, hard protection measures created in one local council area can cause harm that is not confined within its boundaries (IPCC CZMS 1990; APC 2012) . The existence of fiscal imbalances can further complicate attempts to devolve responsibility. Most notably, due to a lack of revenue powers, local councils may not have the resources and capacity to effectively manage coastal climate hazard planning issues (Few et al. 2007; APC 2012) . In interviews conducted for this study, most local council strategic planners stressed this point and emphasised the need for greater state government direction and assistance. The existence of cost-savings, externalities and fiscal imbalances mean that the governance arrangements for planning responses are often better split between different levels of government. The way in which the Victorian planning framework conditionally devolves responsibility to local councils is a reflection of these factors. However, ambiguity in the framework and a jumbled governance structure has led to inconsistent and chaotic decision making. To avoid these issues, policy makers should ensure that the objectives of planning frameworks are clear, there is minimal ambiguity in decision guidelines, and that the resourcing and capacity constraints of planning bodies are appropriately considered.
